Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games is investigated and a continuous-time algorithm is proposed. The algorithm is designed by virtue of projected gradient play dynamics and distributed average tracking dynamics, and is applicable to games with constrained strategy sets and weight-balanced communication graphs. We analyze the complex interaction of these dynamics with the help of input-to-state stability (ISS). By scaling algorithm parameters to render a small-gain condition, we obtain an exponential convergence of the proposed algorithm to the Nash equilibrium. In addition, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of our methods.
games since the well-known Cournot duopoly model was proposed (Osborne & Rubinstein 1994) , where the strategic interaction is clearly characterized via an aggregation term. Recently, aggregative games have been considered in congestion control of communication networks (Barrera & Garcia 2015) , public environmental models (Cornes 2016) , demand response management of power systems (Ye & Hu 2017) , and multiproductfirm oligopoly (Nocke & Schutz 2018) . Because of the large-scale systems involved in these problems, seeking or computing the Nash equilibrium in a distributed manner is of practical significance.
We consider distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games, where the aggregation information is unavailable to each local player and the communication graph can be directed with balanced weights. Similar problems have also been investigated in (Koshal et al. 2016 , Ye & Hu 2017 , Liang et al. 2017 , Deng & Nian 2019 , Zhang et al. 2019 , Parise et al. 2019 . In this work, a small-gain based design is proposed for the considered problem. First, a distributed projected gradient play dynamics is designed, where we replace the global aggregation by its local estimation to calculate the gradient. Then an average tracking dynam-ics is augmented, where the distributed tracking signals are local parts of the aggregation. Inspired by the powerful small-gain technique referring to (Desoer & Vidyasagar 1975 , Jiang et al. 1994 , we analyze these complex interconnected dynamics and prove that our distributed algorithm achieves an exponential convergence to the Nash equilibrium when the tunable parameters are larger/smaller than some constant bounds.
The contributions of this brief paper are as follows:
• A distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm for aggregative game is developed. The algorithm is designed with two interconnected dynamics: a projected gradient play dynamics for equilibrium seeking and a distributed average tracking dynamics for estimation of the aggregation. The projected part can deal with local constrained strategy sets, which generalizes those in (Ye & Hu 2017 , Zhang et al. 2019 . Also, the distributed average tracking dynamics applies to weight-balanced directed graphs, which improves the algorithm in (Liang et al. 2017 ). • Exponential convergence of the proposed distributed algorithm is obtained, which is consistent with the convergence results in (Yi et al. 2016 , Ye & Hu 2017 , Deng & Nian 2019 for unconstrained problems and is stronger than those in (Yi et al. 2016 , Deng & Nian 2019 for constrained ones. In other words, this is a first work, to our knowledge, to propose an exponentially convergent distributed algorithm for aggregative games with local feasible constraints. • To solve our problem, we develop a method based on exponential input-to-state stability (eISS) and smallgain technique. In fact, the method can also be applied to many problems discussed in previous works such as (Ye & Hu 2017 , Liang et al. 2017 , Deng & Nian 2019 , Zhang et al. 2019 for aggregative games and (Gharesifard et al. 2016 , Ye & Hu 2018 , Zeng et al. 2019 , Lei & Shanbhag 2019 for other types of games.
In summary, this work provides new algorithm design and analysis approach to solve distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games over weight-balanced directed graphs. In addition, the proposed method may facilitate distributed optimization , Yuan et al. 2018 , Yang et al. 2018 , Yang et al. 2019 , especially for design and analysis of an exponentially convergent distributed optimization algorithm.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows some basic concepts and preliminary results, while Section 3 formulates the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem of aggregative games. Then Section 4 presents our main results including algorithm design and analysis. Section 5 gives a numerical example to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. Finally, Section 6 gives concluding remarks.
Preliminaries
In this section, we give basic notations and related preliminary knowledge.
Denote R n as the n-dimensional real vector space; denote 1 n = (1, ..., 1) T ∈ R n , and 0 n = (0, ..., 0) T ∈ R n . Denote col(x 1 , ..., x n ) = (x T 1 , ..., x T n ) T as the column vector stacked with column vectors x 1 , ..., x n , · as the Euclidean norm, and I n ∈ R n×n as the identity matrix. Denote ∇f as the gradient of f .
A set C ⊆ R n is convex if λz 1 + (1 − λ)z 2 ∈ C for any z 1 , z 2 ∈ C and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. For a closed convex set C, the projection map P C : R n → C is defined as
The projection map is 1-Lipschitz continuous, i.e.,
Given a subset Ω ⊆ R n and a map F : Ω → R n , the variational inequality problem, denoted by VI(Ω, F ), is to find a vector x * ∈ Ω such that (y − x * ) T F (x * ) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ Ω, and the set of solutions to this problem is denoted by SOL(Ω, F ) (Facchinei & Pang 2003) . When Ω is closed and convex, the solution of VI(Ω, F ) can be equivalently reformulated via projection as follows:
It is known that the information exchange among agents can be described by a graph. A graph with node set V = {1, 2, ..., N } and edge set E is written as G = (V, E) (Godsil & Royle 2001) . The adjacency matrix of G can be written as A = [a ij ] N ×N , where a ij > 0 if (j, i) ∈ E (meaning that agent j can send its information to agent i, or equivalently, agent i can receive some information from agent j), and a ij = 0, otherwise. A graph is said to be strongly connected if, for any pair of vertices, there exists a sequence of intermediate vertices connected by edges. For i ∈ V, the weighted in-degree and out-degree are
The following result is well known.
Lemma 1 Graph G is weight-balanced if and only if L + L T is positive semidefinite; it is strongly connected only if zero is a simple eigenvalue of L.
Finally, a useful stability concept is introduced as fol-
for an exponentially convergent term ρ(·, t) and a constant γ > 0.
Remark 1 The eISS indicates that, in the absence of the external disturbance, the system can converge to its equilibrium with an exponential rate. In fact, ISS plays an important role in nonlinear systems control with fruitful results, and has further extensions such as the finite-time ISS for nonsmooth synthesis (Hong et al. 2010) . Also, it enables the celebrated small-gain technique for the stability/convergence analysis of interconnected dyanmics (Jiang et al. 1994) .
Problem Formulation
Consider an N -player aggregative game as follows. For
, Ω Ω 1 × · · · × Ω N ⊂ R n and n = i∈V n i . The strategy profile of this game is x col(x 1 , ..., x N ) ∈ Ω. The aggregation map σ : R n → R m , to specify the cost function as
where ϕ i : R ni → R m is a map for the local contribution to the aggregation.
The concept of Nash equilibrium is introduced as follows.
Definition 1 A strategy profile x * is said to be an Nash equilibrium of the game if
Condition (2) means that all players simultaneously take their own best (feasible) responses at x * , where no player can further decrease its cost function by changing its decision variable unilaterally.
We assume that the strategy sets and the cost functions are well-conditioned in the following sense.
A1: For any i ∈ V, Ω i is nonempty, convex and closed. A2: For any i ∈ V, the cost function J i (x i , x −i ) and the map ϕ(x i ) are differentiable with respect to x i .
In order to explicitly show the aggregation of the game, let us define map G i :
Under A1 and A2, the Nash equilibrium of the game is a solution of the variational inequality problem VI(Ω, F ), referring to (Facchinei & Pang 2003) . Moreover, we need the following assumptions to ensure the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and also to facilitate algorithm design.
respect to x ∈ Ω and κ 2 -Lipschitz continuous with respect to η for some constants κ 1 , κ 2 > 0. Also, for any i ∈ V, ϕ i is κ 3 -Lipschitz continuous on Ω i for some constant κ 3 > 0. Note that the strong monotonicity of the pseudogradient map F has been widely adopted in the literature such as (Ye & Hu 2017 , Ye & Hu 2018 , Salehisadaghiani et al. 2019 , Yi & Pavel 2019 , Deng & Nian 2019 , Zhang et al. 2019 , Parise et al. 2019 ).
The following fundamental result is from (Facchinei & Pang 2003) .
Lemma 2 Under A1-A4, the considered game admits a unique Nash equilibrium x * .
In the distributed design for our aggregative game, the communication topology for each player to exchange information is assumed as follows.
A5:
The network graph G is strongly connected and weight-balanced. The goal of this paper is to design a distributed algorithm to seek the Nash equilibrium for the considered aggregative game over weight-balanced directed graph.
Main Results
In this section, we first propose our distributed algorithm and then analyze its convergence.
Algorithm
Our distributed continuous-time algorithm for Nash equilibrium seeking of the considered aggregative game is designed as the following differential equations:
Algorithm parameters α and β satisfy
where
and λ 2 is the smallest positive eigenvalue of 1 2 (L + L T ) (L is the Laplacian matrix).
The compact form of (4) can be written as
where ϕ(x) = col(ϕ 1 (x 1 ), ..., ϕ N (x N )). Furthermore, we can rewrite (7) as
The dynamics with respect to x can be regarded as distributed projected gradient play dynamics with the global aggregation σ(x) replaced by local variables η 1 , ..., η N . The dynamics with respect to η is distributed average tracking dynamics that estimates the value of σ(x). The design idea is similar to (Ye & Hu 2017 , Liang et al. 2017 ). Here, we use projection operation to deal with local feasible constraints, and replace the nonsmooth tracking dynamics in (Liang et al. 2017 ) by this simple one to cope with weight-balanced graphs.
Analysis
First, we verify that the equilibrium of dynamics (8) coincides with the Nash equilibrium x * .
Theorem 1 Under A1 -A5, the equilibrium of dynamics (8) is
Proof. The equilibrium of (8) should satisfy
which are obtained by settingẋ,η and d dt ϕ(x) as zeros. Since G is strongly connected, L ⊗ I m η = 0 implies η 1 = η 2 = · · · = η N = η for some η to be further determined.
Since G is weight-balanced, 1 T N L = 0 T N . Combining this property with dynamics (8) yields (0)).
As a result, 1 N
which implies that any equilibrium pair (x , 1 N ⊗ η ) should also satisfy η = σ(x ). Substituting x , 1 N ⊗ η into the projected equation for the equilibrium yields
which indicates x = x * . Therefore, the point given in (9) is the equilibrium of (8). This completes the proof.
In view of the identity (10) derived from (8), let
Then it follows from L1 N = 0 N and (8) thaṫ
The whole dynamics with respect to x and y is consist of two interconnected subsystems as shown in Fig. 1 . Each dynamical subsystem has its own state variable, equilibrium point and external input.
The following lemma gives a criterion for eISS. Readers can refer to (Khalil 2002) for more details.
Lemma 3 Consider a dynamical systemż = f (z, u) with f (z * , u * ) = 0. Suppose that V (z) = 1 2 z − z * 2 is an Lyapunov function such thaṫ for some constants ω, γ > 0. Then the system is (ω, γ)-eISS with
Therefore,
Note that the above inequality also holds for V (z) = 0. This completes the proof.
Our convergence results are given in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Under A1-A5, the distributed continuoustime algorithm (4) with parameters satisfying (5) converges to the Nash equilibrium with an exponential convergence rate.
Proof. We divide the proof into three steps.
Step 1: We prove that dynamics (11) is (ω 1 , γ 1 )-eISS, where
We verify the following three properties.
1) ξ(x, y) ≤ α · κ 2 y .
2) The map F is κ-Lipschitz continuous.
3) The map H is ω 1 -strongly monotone.
Property 1) holds because
Property 2) follows from the fact that
Property 3) holds because
In addition, there holds the identity H(x * ) = 0, since x * is the Nash equilibrium.
Consider the following Lyapunov candidate function
Its time derivative along the trajectory of (11) iṡ
It follows from Lemma 3 that dynamics (11) is (ω 1 , γ 1 )-eISS. This completes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2: We prove that dynamics (12) is (ω 2 , γ 2 )-eISS, where
where the time derivativeẋ is along the dynamics (11).
Then y = y + y ⊥ . Since 1 T N L = 0 T N , it follows from (12) that˙ y = 0, y(0) = 0.
As a result,
The time derivative of V along the trajectory of (12) iṡ
where the last inequality follows from Rayleigh quotient theorem (Horn & Johnson 2013, Page 234) .
Therefore, it follows from Lemma 3 that dynamics (12) is (ω 2 , γ 2 )-eISS. This completes the proof of Step 2.
Step 3: We prove that the distributed algorithm (4) converges to the Nash equilibrium with an exponential rate.
It follows from the results given in Step 1 and Step 2 that
and
Moreover, condition (5) indicates that
This completes the whole proof.
Remark 2 In our analysis, the eISS properties of the projected equilibrium seeking dynamics (11) and the distributed average tracking dynamics (12) play a key role.
To establish the eISS of these dynamics is not a trivial work and relies on a few newly derived results such as the ω 1 -strong monotonicity of the map H. Moreover, the Lyapunov functions adopted here, though very simple, are different from those used in (Yi et al. 2016 , Liang et al. 2017 ) for projected dynamics. The Lyapunov function based analyses given in those works are sufficient to guarantee convergence, but they may not be easily extended to establish an eISS result.
Remark 3 Exponential convergence of distributed algorithms has become a research topic in recent years. (Nedić et al. 2017) has designed a distributed discretetime optimization algorithm and proves its exponential convergence via a small-gain approach, while ) has introduced a criterion for the exponential convergence of distributed primal-dual gradient algorithms in either continuous or discrete time. Theorem 2 provides a new method to establish the exponential convergence of distributed continuous-time Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics. More specifically, it follows from the proof of Theorem 2 that eISS property plus small-gain condition for interconnected subsystems imply exponential convergence of the whole system.
Numerical Example
Consider a Cournot game played by N = 20 competitive players. For i ∈ V = {1, ..., N }, the cost function ϑ i (x i , σ) and strategy set Ω i are
,
It can be verified that the game mode satisfies A1-A4 with constants µ = 0.1770, κ 1 = 0.2199, κ 2 = 0.0030, κ 3 = 1. We adopt a network graph as shown in Fig. 2 , which satisfies A5.
To render condition (5), we assign α = 3 and β = 1. The trajectory of strategy profile generated by our algorithm is shown in Fig. 3 .
In order to make some comparisons, we also use directed cycle graph and undirected Erdos-Renyi (ER) graph for the algorithm. The performance of the algorithm with these graphs is shown in Fig. 4 . The theoretical rates ω 1 , ω 2 obtained by using the formulas in the proof of Theorem 2 and the real one ω identified from the trajectory are given in Table 1 . These results indicate that Fig. 4 . Performance of the algorithm with different graphs. our distributed algorithm exponentially converges to the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the convergence may still hold when the small gain condition is violated. This phenomenon is reasonable because the our theoretical estimations may be conservative.
Finally, we use the undirected ER graph to compare our algorithm with the one given in (Liang et al. 2017 ). The numerical results are shown in Fig. 5 . It indicates that our algorithm converges faster than that algorithm. In addition, only our algorithm applies to directed graphs such as the original graph and the directed cycle graph. 
Conclusions
A distributed algorithm has been proposed for Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games, where the strategy set can be constrained and the network is described by a weight-balanced graph. The eISS of each dynamics has been revealed, and the exponential convergence has been established under the small-gain condition. The effectiveness of our method has also been illustrated by a numerical example. Further work may consider generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem for aggregative games with coupled constraints.
